In ports, the immobility of capital and the costs of strike action to shipping lines, customers and wider economic interests, significantly increases the bargaining power of labor. As Knowles observed many years ago, 'dockers largely regulate the pulse of external trade on the steadiness of which the country's health, in terms of competitive power and living standards, so much depends.' 10 Moreover, dockers in most countries are renown as a well-organized and traditionally militant occupational group. 11 The particular manifestation of globalization in the port transport sector, and the ensuing conflict between capital and labor, is therefore discussed in an historical and international context, recognising that international trends are not simply translated into common pressures in all national economies 'but rather are mediated by national institutional arrangements and refracted into divergent struggles over particular national practices.' 12 Globalization has not only been contested on the waterfront, but these divergent struggles have delayed and in some ports diverted the ambitions of global capital.
Strike Waves on the Waterfront
Conditions of work on the waterfront at the turn of the century were notorious in all countries, 'rarely anything but strenuous, always dirty, often unhealthy, and sometimes decidedly dangerous.' 13 [a] raging and shouting mass … he would pick and choose the slaves with wanton brutality, as one throwing scraps to hungry wolves, to delight in the exhibition of a savage struggle for existence.' 14 In all ports work was uncertain. On the US West Coast, labor was recruited to unload sailing vessels at the last minute by shore-side criers calling -'Men along the shore!' (giving rise to the term longshoremen). 15 Without control over the inflow of workers to the docks a permanent oversupply of labor created chronic underemployment, with wages barely sufficient to support a family. For many commentators 'it seemed incredible that the "degraded dockers" … would ever be capable of united action.' 16 But the nature of dockers'
work, and the uncertainty of their lives, helped to forge a common psychology of group loyalty. Outside work, ' The stern reality of ever-pressing starvation draws all together. Communism is a necessity of their life: they share all with one another.' 17 Inside work, 'The common adage "one out, all out" was no ideological invention;
it was a product of necessity if men were to hold any standards or preserve even the meagerest conditions of work.' 18 Dockers quickly learnt from bitter experience that only complete strikes would preserve or improve basic pay and other terms of employment on the waterfront. 19 Major strikes were fought in ports around the world to establish a system to regulate the vagaries of casual employment. In particular, unions sought to establish control over labor supply (via a scheme of statutory employment registration or union membership cards to identify bona fide dock workers), a system of job allocation to ensure a more equitable distribution of available work (via a centralised, state-run employment centre or union hiring hall), and provision for 'maintenance' payments or guaranteed wages when no work was available (via the payment of 'attendance money' and/or statutory unemployment benefits). The Great London Dock Strike of 1889 is usually remembered for the wage demand of 6d per hour (the 'docker's tanner'), but for Ben Tillett the objective 'was, essentially, the system of dock employment.' 20 The strike secured a half day minimum 'turn' or shift, with just two turns per day, and a virtual closed shop via the transfer of hiring from inside to outside the dock gates where a union card inspection could be made. Similar demands lay at the heart of the 1934 US West Coast strike: a union-controlled hiring hall that would end all forms of discrimination and favoritism in hiring and equalize work opportunities, a 6 hour working day, a coastwise contract to eliminate port-by-port competition, and a definition of longshoring to establish work jurisdiction.
Employers, not surprisingly, resisted such demands. Tillett's union, for example, was eased out of the London docks by an employer counter-offensive involving the extensive use of scab/non-union labor, orchestrated by the newly formed Shipping Federation. Employer interests were better served by an 'unregulated' (i.e. employer dominated) casual labor market, not least because it hamstrung union attempts to organize dock laborers and produced a high work rate at minimum cost. Thus, even when labor market regulation was firmly established, as in many countries after World War II when statutory 'dock labour schemes' were introduced, employers fought a rearguard action to undermine union control. The years that followed the establishment of the Australian Stevedoring Industry Board (ASIB) and the NDLS in Britain, for example, were marked by a wave of strikes. Employers contested the loss of managerial prerogative over hiring, allocation, discipline and dismissal under the new employment schemes and a succession of strikes were fought over the imposition of disciplinary penalties. 21 In Australia, man-hours lost as a percentage of man-hours worked over the period 1946/7 to 1956/7 were the highest of any decade in the post-war era. 22 In Britain, the annual average number of working days lost from 1947-55 was 314,234, a figure only surpassed in the turbulent years of decasualization and modernization between 1967-72, and questions of managerial authority figured prominently in many disputes. 23 In the face of such concerted rank-and-file opposition, employers in both countries, and ultimately the statutory authorities, eventually abandoned attempts to impose mass discipline on the workforce.
Employers in New Zealand also complained bitterly about discipline under the new 'bureau' system of employment established under the Waterfront Industry Commission (WIC) in 1947 (whereby employers had to accept men allocated from the statutory port bureau on the basis of accumulated hours, such that watersiders with the lowest hours worked were allocated first). In particular, employers contested the increase in 'spelling' or on/off working, where several members of the gang take a rest or 'spell' off, which they attributed to a decline in discipline. Shirking watersiders could be returned to the bureau and the WIC would impose disciplinary penalties, but this simply aggravated industrial relations. 24 By 1951 the employers were keen to precipitate a final showdown on the waterfront, and the New Zealand Waterside Workers' Union, one of the most industrially militant and radical trade unions in New Zealand, was defeated and derecognized after a bitter 151-day strike. Twenty-six port-based unions were established in place of the national union and non-union labor was hired to replace the striking watersiders. 25 Likewise in France, even though dockers were now registered with a statutory employment office, the Bureau Central de la Main d'Oeuvre (BCMO), employers sought to break labor control on the waterfront. In Marseilles, for example, employers deployed troops and then made a general call for labor during a dispute in 1950. Thereafter, the employers rejected existing collective agreements and the unions, already fragmented along political lines, were not formally recognized again until 1963. 26 In both countries, however, union organization was rebuilt from the grass roots and by the late 1960s dockers had secured de facto control over the statutory employment system. 27 Through their influence over the hiring and allocation of labor, longshore unions were able to establish jurisdiction over 'dock work' and thereby reduce and contain the chronic labor surpluses and competition for work that had so bedevilled union organization in the past and depressed rank-and-file militancy. In Franzosi's terms, strikes on the waterfront had transformed the very structures that brought them to the fore of history. In Britain, for example, 'dock work' was now defined by statute and only registered employers who engaged registered dockers were legally permitted to perform such work. In the event of a strike, therefore, it was illegal for employers to hire non-registered (scab) labor to perform 'dock work.' 28 For most dockers, however, the desideratum was a system of union-controlled work sharing, rather than a statutory labor scheme under the joint control of employers or the ultimate sanction of the state, or indeed an employer-managed labor pool as in As in other ports around the world at this time, employers on the West Coast 'did their best to break the union', and the years which followed the 1934 strike 'were among the stormiest in US labor history.' 32 But this wave of strike activity eventually led to a new bargaining and organizational structure on the West Coast in the shape of the Mechanization and Modernization (M&M) Agreements of 1960 and 1966. 33 As early as 1957 the ILWU and the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) had agreed to the guiding principle that longshoremen should be guaranteed a share of the benefits from mechanization, which was already transforming work on the waterfront. The principal benefits of the M&M Agreements for longshoremen were employment security (no enforced layoffs) and a guaranteed wage based on the equivalent of 35 hours (straight-time) per week. In return, employers secured substantial freedom to (re)organize work, operate efficiently and utilize labor-saving devices.
The M&M Agreements thus paved the way for containerization on the West Coast, but three issues came to the fore by the late 1960s which in 1971 sparked the first coastwise strike since 1948.
First, job security was threatened by containerization as the new technology could reduce labor requirements in the port by around 90 per cent on general cargo operations. 34 Secondly, new technology disrupted established patterns of work distribution as employers preferred to employ 'steady' (permanent) workers on the new capital-intensive container operations, creating a situation where some longshoremen were regularly employed and highly paid while those allocated from the hall were frequently underemployed. 35 Thirdly, dock work was relocated outside the port area, raising jurisdiction disputes with other unions and/or occupational groups.
These issues lay at the heart of the strike wave that swept through the world's ports in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. In the UK, for example, employers had pledged that there would be no redundancies as a result (ab)use of the TUR as a 'backdoor' method to dismiss surplus labor precipitated a national strike in 1972. 36 This was the second national dock strike in two years. The three week strike in July 1970 was the first national dock strike since 1926 and came just months after a twenty-seven month ban on handling containers in the port of London (Tilbury) was finally lifted. 37 As Jensen noted at the time, however, the ban on new modernization agreements was not due to opposition to technological change: 'Improvements were wanted but equally for all.' 38 In ports where dockers were employed by a comprehensive port authority responsible for all port operations, such as Liverpool, London and Southampton, dockers insisted on a system of rotation across different terminals to equalize work and earnings. In London, shop stewards pursued the work-sharing ethos to the 'egalitarian extreme.' 39 Unlike the system of 100 per cent permanent employment introduced in Britain, both France and New
Zealand retained a predominantly casual employment system, much to the chagrin of employers. In Marseilles, employers had previously experimented with the employment of permanent dockers but the venture was discouraged when the government held that the employers still had to pay the full levy (based on a percentage of the company's wage bill) which financed the wage guarantee of 'professionnel casual' dockers and the administration costs of the BCMO. 40 This negated the potential cost savings of permanent labor and the employers abandoned the experiment. With the onset of containerization the employers tried again. After several major disputes a compromise was reached whereby 'professionnel permanent' dockers could be hired for up to six months and then returned to the BCMO, and the guarantee was raised from 200 to 300 shifts per annum. 41 A similar system was introduced in New Zealand, whereby watersiders worked for just three to six months on container terminals before returning to the employment bureau. The major New Zealand employers had proposed permanent employment, with an employer managed 'holding company' to supply smaller companies and meet any peak labor requirements, but the watersiders defended the bureau system and demanded a guaranteed 40 hours pay per week instead of permanency. 42 The retention of the bureau system, and many of the work practices associated with casualism, limited the productive potential of new technology and proved to be a persistent source of contention. As Figure 1 illustrates, there were five times as many strikes on the New Zealand waterfront in the 1970s compared to the 1960s, and twice as many man-hours lost in industrial disputes. As in Britain, strike action only abated when the New Zealand dock labor scheme was abolished in 1989. 43 
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Disputes over the allocation or distribution of work within the existing dock labor force were further exacerbated by the loss of work to other occupational groups. Crane drivers in both France and New Zealand, for example, were employed by the (public) port authorities whereas dockers were traditionally hired by (private) stevedoring companies or shipping lines. Containerization increased the work of the former to the detriment of the latter. More generally, in all ports around the world, the stuffing/loading and stripping/unloading of containers was relocated outside the port area, leading to questions of jurisdiction over 'dock work' and in many countries the very definition of 'dock work.' These 'disputes of right' frequently involved inter-port solidarity to preserve dockers' exclusive jurisdiction over such work, and it was not uncommon for strikes in the late 1960s and early 1970s to be national or coastwise as well as port and companybased. In the 1968 US East Coast strike, for example, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA)
sought not only exclusive rights to stuff and strip containers but identical container clauses for all ports on the eastern seaboard. 44 In New Zealand there were just two multi-port disputes prior to the 1970s (in 1959 and 1967) but thereafter multi-port disputes occurred in every year except 1973, 1975 and 1986 . In 1971, New
Zealand's ports were hit by the first national strike since 1951. In Britain, as already indicated, containerization also heralded a number of multi-port disputes. This is illustrated in Figure 2 by the difference between 'net' and 'gross' disputes (a strike with the same cause or object that occurred simultaneously in ten ports would be counted as just one net strike but ten gross disputes). 45 
FIGURE 2 HERE
Although dock worker solidarity came to the fore in the 1970s, containerization was rapidly undermining the traditional work culture on the waterfront and in many countries led to a reorientation in dockers' outlook from the industry to the firm. On the US West Coast, for example, differences between steady men and longshoremen working out of the hiring hall were evident in both the work experience and daily discourse of these two groups. 46 But these divisions within the workforce, and the decline of dockland communities, did not precipitate the demise of solidarity and conflict on the waterfront. As Finlay discovered, steady men would engage in individual 'strikes' and 'deals' to defend and improve working conditions and more formalized conflict was relocated to the Labor Relations Committee and arbitration hearings. 47 More importantly, on a day-to-day basis, longshoremen continued to dispute managerial directives, despite contractual obligations to the contrary: 'They use the contract as a weapon. It enables them to struggle with their employers for shopfloor control by being defensibly disobedient.' per cent in less than a decade on most routes. 50 According to Seok-Min Lim, 'it is now possible to make almost anything anywhere and ship it to almost anywhere without affecting the price.' 51 Developments in the shipping industry, and in particular the relentless growth of containerized traffic, is therefore central to both restructuring on the waterfront and the more general globalization of capital.
52
Workers on the waterfront are confronted by globalization in their daily lives: vessels owned by multinational corporations (MNCs), invariably registered under a 'flag of convenience' and typically crewed by cheap labor from developing countries, bring a multitude of goods from around the world into their port. These goods are increasingly carried on container rather than general cargo (break-bulk) vessels, and container vessels grow ever larger in order to realise economies of scale. 53 A 6,000 Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) container vessel, for example, can give a 21 per cent cost advantage over a 4,000 TEU ship on a typical transpacific rotation. 54 However, the immediate effect of mega-ship building is over-tonnage on the world's major liner routes and a further decline in freight rates initiated in the first instance by competition from shipping lines outside the established liner conferences (e.g. ZIM and COSCO) and aggressive new market entrants from Asia (e.g. Evergreen, Hanjin and Yangming). 55 Moreover, the cost advantage of a 6,000 TEU container vessel evaporates at less than 80 per cent utilisation, which results in further discounting in order to gain more traffic, secure cash flow and knock out competition. 56 The principal effects of the globalization of shipping on ports are twofold. First, increasing ship size forces ports to invest in deeper maritime access channels, larger cranes, more extensive stacking areas, and more sophisticated logistic control systems. In many ports around the world, local or national government has traditionally funded such investment, but the scale of investment is now beyond public finances in many countries. Secondly, in a trading environment plagued by over-capacity in the shipping industry and low(er) freight rates, cutting cost is everything. However, ship related costs represent only 30 per cent of the total intermodal logistics costs from origin to destination. Attention has therefore focused on ports and in particular cargo handling where labor costs typically account for around 60 per cent of total operating costs, even on capitalintensive container terminals.
A common response to limited public sector funds for port investment, especially in developing countries where structural adjustment programs have been imposed by the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, is privatization. A recent survey reported that around 150 countries world-wide had either introduced, or were actively considering, some form of port privatization. 57 A World Bank review of the top 100 container ports in 1997 revealed that eighty-eight conformed to the 'landlord' model under which the public port authority retains ultimate property rights over port land and regulatory authority over navigation, conservancy and the like, but cargo handling operations are now provided on a commercial basis by the private sector.
International shipping lines, in an attempt to secure control over the entire logistics chain and provide a door-todoor service to customers, are increasingly active in container handling. The most notable examples are P&O and Maersk/Sea-Land. 58 Recent years have also witnessed the emergence of global port operating companies It is often noted that MNCs have greater potential to divide labor and draw on sophisticated techniques of labor control, thereby precipitating an international 'race to the bottom' in terms of pay and conditions of employment. 60 An equally common retort, however, is that such a process is not inevitable: instead of simply cutting (labor) costs, international competitiveness might be constructed on the basis of high levels of investment in physical and human capital, high wages and high productivity. Under this interpretation the impact of globalization on workers' terms and conditions of employment is an empirical rather than a theoretical question, but it is often noted that there is a dearth of such empirical data. 61 In ports, however, detailed research from both individual countries and global surveys suggests that a race to the bottom is very much is evidence, and the leaders in this race are the international shipping lines and the new global port operators.
Evidence of the deleterious effects of port reform in Britain and New Zealand has already been cited Permanent employment was a key objective for employers in both France and New Zealand, for example, resulting in the abolition of the BCMO and WIC respectively in 1989. In both countries, however, workforce resistance crucially shaped the subsequent reform process. In New Zealand, union control at the port level, and the union's capacity to organize national strike action, initially remained intact after the abolition of the WIC. The willingness and ability of the Waterfront Workers' Union (WWU) to engage in strike action resulted in the WWU securing important protections for its members. 65 In France, strikes and other forms of industrial disruption not only delayed agreement on the new system of employment post-1989 but also delayed the full implementation of agreed reform by at least two years (1992-94). Nationally, French ports experienced more than fifty days of strike action in 1992. Marseilles was hit by over 100 days of strike action. National and local strikes, go-slows and other forms of disruption continued throughout 1993-94.
The restructuring of Italian ports over the period 1991-94 was equally fractious. In 1991 the dockers' monopoly over labor supply was successfully challenged in the European Court of Justice. 66 Private operators, including PSA Corporation, Hutchinson, P&O and Evergreen now operate, or plan to operate, private terminals with their own dedicated, permanently employed labor force recruited from outside the ranks of the Compagnie.
The dockers' guilds were legally obliged to become 'commercial' companies in 1994, but the Compagnie in Genoa, Italy's major general cargo port, has still not fully transformed itself. Moreover, the dockers in Genoa have not only secured the concession to operate one of the port's major terminals, but exclusive rights to supply any supplementary labor to other operators in the port. Employers conceded this right following a prolonged period of industrial disruption that included, according to one employer, arson attacks and other forms of sabotage. 67 Although they prefer, and invariably demand, permanent company-based employment as a condition of investing in a private terminal, shipping lines and global terminal operators still require numerical flexibility. In particular, operators need supplementary labor to meet peak operational demand and many prefer to hire contract labor for less skilled jobs such as container un/lashing and driving prime movers from the quay crane to the container stack, and vice versa. The provision of such services has traditionally been the preserve of portbased (statutory) labor pools or union hiring halls, but MNCs are far less willing to tolerate union control or state regulation of daily labor allocation. In Britain, employers have effectively 'privatized' the supply of labor, utilizing their own lists of casual workers, including former registered dockers, engaging the services of private employment agencies, or simply recruiting labor from the unemployment register. 68 In New Zealand, as already noted, the WWU was initially able to regulate labor supply on the New Zealand waterfront after the abolition of the WIC, but restrictions on strike action embodied in the Employment Contracts Act 1991 resulted in a shift from casuals being employed by agreement to the assertion of managerial prerogative over hiring and firing decisions. 69 French employers sought rather different arrangements, again reflecting struggles over particular national practices. Although there is still provision for employers to call on occasionnel dockers, French ports have effectively moved to a 100 per cent permanent/company-based system. Many employers admit that this system limits numerical flexibility, but their over-riding concern was to finally rid the ports of professionnel casual dockers and break the unions' control over labor supply and the daily allocation of dockers to specific jobs. These issues continue to animate management-labor relations in French ports. 70 The militancy and solidarity of Spanish dockers also played a key role in the country's port reform program initiated in the mid 1980s. Port employers are now allowed to hire permanent dockers from the ranks of the existing labor force but, in contrast to France, the majority of dockers are still allocated from the relations system, however, as in most continental European countries, port unions have been far more successful in defending members' terms and conditions of employment. In Spain, for example, provisions exist for national and/or regional collective bargaining at the industry level with works councils at the workplace, creating the potential for 'rich bargaining' through co-ordination or 'articulation' between the industry and workplace levels. 74 The 'dual system' in Spain is not fully exploited in most industries owing to a combination of trade union policy and employer opposition. In particular, most Spanish unions have used their institutional involvement to compensate for organizational weakness at the workplace. 75 On the waterfront, in contrast, the Coordinadora, the principal dockers' union, sought to utilize this system when faced with port privatization and state-sponsored reform of the labor pool. By sustaining the democratic involvement and mobilization of rankand-file dockers the Coordinadora has been able to consolidate its formal position at both the industry and workplace levels through collective bargaining and the works councils. Informal control of the labor process is still vigorously defended by individual workers, dock gangs and workplace union representatives. 76 Likewise, the ambitions of capital in France and Italy have been mediated by national institutional arrangements and in particular the ability of dock workers, through solidarity, to mobilize these arrangements in the defence of jobs, informal work practices and established terms and conditions of employment.
Many of the strikes that have been fought on the waterfront in recent years are, of course, defensive. In general, the impact of defensive strikes in an era of global capital, especially when only a single group of workers withdraw their labor, is arguably much diminished. 77 On the waterfront, however, even localised strikes can impose significant costs on operators, port users, importers, exporters, and ultimately the consumer. 81 Thus, the dilemma facing (global) capital in the world's ports is that the employment arrangements that companies are seeking to dismantle continue to sustain a work culture and patterns of group loyalty that are not only antithetical to the interests of capital but predispose dockers towards solidarity and militancy on a company, port, national and even international basis.
Conclusions
Globalization often invokes the image of an increasingly homogeneous world economy dominated by footloose capital, and workers are often portrayed as being powerless in the face of capital mobility unless they can themselves develop a global strategy in response. But international labor co-operation is in no way 'inevitable'
and is unlikely to follow simply from a realisation of economic interdependence. 82 In fact, globalization is arguably more likely to produce economic nationalism rather than international co-operation. 83 This is also true on the waterfront, but on numerous occasions dockers have been able to transcend their immediate economic interests and their dependence on national opportunity structures and mount successful campaigns of international solidarity. In fact, waterfront trade unions display many of the characteristics deemed essential for international solidarity and effective international trade unionism, namely organizational comprehensiveness and inclusiveness (i.e. high levels of union membership/density and extensive affiliation to an international trade secretariat), internal authority within individual unions and the relevant international trade secretariat, and external recognition by employers, governments and international agencies. 84 Moreover, ports are fixed assets. This is not to deny increasing inter-port competition or the impact of larger vessels that tend to call at fewer ports. Nonetheless, the range of ports that actively compete with each other is often limited which makes international union strategies more viable. In Europe, for example, international union co-operation can be focused around the key port zones of the northern range (Le Havre to Hamburg), Baltic Sea ports and the Mediterranean. More importantly, even national responses pose a major challenge to the ambitions of global capital. Waterfront unions have been able to mobilize significant power resources to defend their members' interests, not least the regulatory institutions or dock labor schemes that (global) capital has sought to dismantle. To be sure, these resources differ from one port to the next, and this is reflected in the divergent struggles taking place around the world over specific national practices. 85 But it is hard to find a port where globalization is not being contested by dock labor and the disruptive capacity of dock strikes should not be underestimated.
Notes

